Is Saudi Arabia trying to get nuclear weapons?
Is Saudi Arabia trying to get nuclear weapons?
  • Korea IT Times
  • 승인 2015.05.25 22:10
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President Obama, with Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Nayef

Rumours abound that Saudi Arabia may seek nuclear weapons as a result of dissatisfaction at the prospects of a nuclear deal between Iran and the international community. Posturing aside, there are reasons to doubt their ability to acquire nuclear weapons.

Nonetheless, there are precautionary actions that likeminded governments, including the UK, should take to head off any attempt by Saudi Arabia to acquire nuclear weapons.

The first should be to make clear that nuclear weapons would make Saudi Arabia less safe not least because the country’s substantial appetite for advanced Western-manufactured weapons would go unsatisfied.

There has long been a belief among some that Saudi Arabia had kept open the option of acquiring nuclear weapons should circumstances warrant it. This is despite the country acceding to the Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1988 and implementation of the IAEA’s Additional Protocol (which is intended to prevent clandestine nuclear programmes) since 2009.

The current wave of news articles seems to suggest a current and revised interest in members of the Saud royal family to acquire nuclear weapons. There are factors that could account for a sudden revised interest weapons accusation.

Perhaps the main strategic driver relates to the P5+1’s nuclear negotiations with Iran. Saudi Arabia is one of Iran’s main regional competitors and there have long been concerns that if Iran acquired nuclear weapons other countries in the region would follow.

 

Iran is not on the brink of acquiring nuclear weapons, however, and the negotiations currently taking place with a deadline of mid-summer could leave Iran even further from nuclear weapons than it has been for the last several years. In this context, it is important to note that the Saudi leadership has generally expressed approval for a nuclear deal with Iran.

If the negotiations with Iran have triggered a renewed interest in nuclear weapons in Saudi Arabia, it is perhaps more likely that the Saudi royals are seeking to use their apparent interest in acquiring them in order to influence the negotiations rather than seeking nuclear weapons for their own use.

It is also possible that Saudi’s calculus regarding nuclear weapons has changed for other reasons. One possible reason for this could be changes in the country’s leadership. King Salman’s enthronement has brought changes to the country’s approach to foreign policy and the appointment of the his son as defence minister has resulted in the country taking unusually bold action against Iran-backed forces in Yemen. It cannot be ruled out that the new leadership, unafraid of bold policy choices in pursuit of the country’s international security goals, could also decide to acquire nuclear weapons.

Even if Saudi was to decide to do so, however, it is far from clear that the country is capable of acquiring nuclear weapons. After all, the country’s own nuclear infrastructure is nascent and orientated towards civil purposes.

More plausibly, following a deal between the P5+1 and Iran, Saudi Arabia could seek to exercise the same right to enrich uranium that Iran claims for its own program as part of a nuclear hedging strategy. Supplier restraint in relation to transfers of enrichment technology mean that it is unlikely that Saudi could buy such a capability outright. The country does have some of the prerequisite industry to embark on an indigenous effort, however, which would be a longer term proposition (likely lasting some decades).

The second possibility would be for Saudi to acquire weapons ‘off the shelf’ from Pakistan. The likelihood of this scenario is difficult to quantify: certainly, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia have a unique relationship.

However, would Pakistan be willing to proliferate Pakistan is still struggling to overcome the damaged international reputation it suffered as a result of the actions of AQ Khan, who passed on the country’s uranium enrichment and possibly nuclear weapons designs to at least three countries include Libya, Iran and North Korea.

Pakistan has enacted a systematic export controls to prevent such a recurrence (although there is some question about how well this system functions as it is understood that no licences for authorised transfers of any nuclear technology have been granted).

It is also likely that Chinese pressure would restrain Pakistan from transferring nuclear weapons to Saudi Arabia: China is currently subject to intense diplomatic pressure over its decision to sell nuclear reactors to Pakistan. Should an egregious nuclear transfer take place from Pakistan, the prospects of such civil nuclear cooperation, which is important to Pakistan’s own development, would be bleak. Finally, there are also practical hurdles over transferring nuclear weapons from Pakistan to Saudi Arabia (perhaps the least of which is the US 5th fleet).

The possibility that Saudi Arabia could acquire nuclear weapons from Pakistan is thus remote but cannot be discounted. As such, it is appropriate to consider what measures could be taken to dissuade or prevent Saudi Arabia from acquiring nuclear weapons.

The international community appears already taken the steps necessary to head-off the indigenous path. Saudi has signed the NPT and implements the additional protocol – measures that key international partners required before expanding civil nuclear cooperation with the country. Potential supplier countries should continue to exercise vigilance to ensure that no clandestine program emerges in Saudi Arabia and resist any requests for transfer of enrichment and reprocessing technologies.

Western firms that manufacture enrichment-related goods should also be put on alert about the possibility of enquiries from Saudi Arabia (or entities acting on Saudi’s behalf) in the same way that they are already on alert for enquires from Iran.

With regards to acquisition of nuclear weapons from Pakistan, international partners should make clear to Saudi leadership that nuclear weapons would not make the country safer. Conceptually, there are two parts to this argument.

First, it can be highlighted that US security guarantees are present that mean that the country does not need nuclear weapons. Second, it should be highlighted that sales of conventional arms to Saudi Arabia (worth some $6.9 billion since 2010, with most coming from the UK and US) would be put at risk if the country was to seek to acquire nuclear weapons. Evidently, however, the US and UK must also be prepared to follow through with these policies if any Saudi interest in acquiring nuclear weapons is to be pre-empted.

Source: The Telegraph

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