The Wagner Effect and the Current Russian Crisis
The Wagner Effect and the Current Russian Crisis
  • Korea IT Times
  • 승인 2023.06.27 02:51
  • 댓글 0
이 기사를 공유합니다

By Edwin J. Matthews, Researcher at The Asia Institute
Putin's chef Prigozhin.

 

The recent declaration by oligarch Yevgeny Prigozhin, the outspoken mercenary tycoon of Wagner PMC, that he had taken the Russian city of Bakhmut has raised speculations as to his possible ambitions. President Vladimir Putin will turn 72 years old but shows no interest in stepping down. If anything, he is stepping up his game. Yet, many ask who will lead Russia if Putin resigns, is incapacitated, or dies.

Russian generals accused oligarch Yevgeny Prigozhin, the outspoken mercenary tycoon of Wagner PMC, of trying to mount a coup against President Vladimir Putin, as the Russian authorities opened an investigation into Mr. Prigozhin for "organizing an armed rebellion." The conflict has grown more acute since Prigozhin's claim to have taken Bakhmut.

As of 2023, the front-runner for the top position after Putin seems to be Yevgeny Viktorovich Prigozhin, the owner of the private neo-Nazi mercenary army "Wagner."

Prigozhin is also called "Putin's chef" because his restaurants and catering businesses hosted dinners attended by Putin with foreign dignitaries. Prigozhin gained Putin's patronage when he served him food on a gold plate and asked his Tsar, "how is my salad, my lord?"

Who is this hotshot dude Prigozhin?

Prigozhin controls a network of companies including Wagner Group (a Russian state-backed mercenary group) operating in North and Central Africa, Syria, and now in Ukraine; and three companies accused of interference in the 2016 U.S. elections.

The U.S. government named Prigozhin as one of the individuals suspected to be involved in the 2016 U.S. elections favoring Trump. As per the FBI, Prigozhin has close links with the G.U. or GRU, the Russian military intelligence, who supposedly provided what the Russians called "kompromat" (i.e., "dirt") such as hacked emails from Hillary Clinton's laptop to Donald Trump Jr.

Whether that story is accurate, or how accurate it is, is beyond the scope of this article.

The origin of the name "Wagner" comes from German composer Richard Wagner, chosen due to the Russian far-right's passion for the Third Reich and Germanic paganism. Wagner, a noted antisemite, was also Hitler's favorite composer. The choice must be seen in the context of Ukrainian neo-Nazis and Russian neo-Nazis killing each other in eastern Ukraine.

Prigozhin is accused of recruiting criminals and inmates in Russian prisons, promising them freedom or reduced sentences if they serve six months with the Wagner Group—and gruesome punishments if they desert.

Prigozhin himself was arrested and sent to labor camps back in the Soviet era; hence, prison is not a new place for him but rather his hometown. He formed his criminal networks in Soviet prisons with the notorious "Vory v Zakone" or "Thieves in Law," also known as the Russian mafia. The ruthless Russian mafia took shape in Soviet prisons and bloomed after the collapse of the Soviet Union. They have influence around the world these days.

The Wagner Group, also known as "Gruppa Vagnera" in Russian (let's refer to them as "Wagnerites"), is a private military company (PMC) that forms a network of mercenaries supporting a private army serving as the Russian armed forces in eastern Ukraine. While the Wagner Group itself is not ideologically driven, certain elements within Wagner have been linked to neo-Nazis and far-right extremists. The Wagnerites are led by ex-GRU Colonel Dimitriy Utkin, a ruthless soldier of fortune and neo-Nazi, whose body is covered with tattoos such as the "Reichsadler," the coat of arms of the Third Reich. On his collar bones are the insignia of the Sig runes of the Nazi-SS and three diamond pips, representing the military rank of a "Hauptsturmführer" (Captain) of the SS.

It's ironic that Putin harkens back to the Soviet legacy of defeating Germany in his public speeches, yet he depends on neo-Nazis like Utkin to teach the rebellious Ukrainians a lesson.

The GRU, now called G.U., was the Soviet and currently Russian military intelligence.

Prigozhin is hailed as a hero in Soledar. Soledar is a town in the Bakhmut Raion, located in what is internationally recognized as the Donetsk Oblast of Ukraine. Back on August 22, Russian ground forces captured Bakhmutske (and most of Soledar). Month after month, the Russian army in Ukraine delivers nothing but body bags, disappointments, and setbacks.

In the meantime, Prigozhin's mercenaries have built up a reputation as "the most battle-ready" faction of the Russian armed forces in Ukraine. While news about incompetence, disorganization, and theft within the Russian military is abundant, the "Wagnerites" are reported to continue fighting relentlessly.

Russia badly needs heroes in the present day, and Prigozhin is ready to step into the limelight the moment the Kremlin calls upon him for duty.

The Wagnerites allegedly fight at Prigozhin's own expense. Reportedly, Prigozhin uses the proceeds from his mines in Central Africa (especially in the Congo and Central African Republic) and from wells in Syria not only to cover their maintenance costs but also to purchase weapons and ammunition from various sources on the open market, grey market, or black market, ranging from Libya in the west to North Korea in the east. Prigozhin's private army is equipped with increasingly sophisticated cannons, tanks, and aircraft—and he has the financial resources to support them. His wealth comes from outside Russia, where President Putin cannot control it, which distinguishes him from other Russian oligarchs. Prigozhin has a reputation as a no-nonsense and relentless warrior in President Putin's service.

What does history have in store for Russia?

We must remember that the Russians have witnessed episodes in their recent history where "state servants from hell" found themselves at the forefront of the political game during critical moments. Lavrentiy Beria was the ruthless chief of the Soviet Secret Police NKVD (predecessor of the KGB) who became the de-facto ruler of the USSR for a few months after Stalin's death in 1953. Beria was eventually outmaneuvered by his rivals, Nikita Khrushchev and General Georgy Zhukov, who had him deposed and executed. Another example is General Alexandr Lebed, whom post-Soviet President Boris Yeltsin brought into the limelight to navigate the unpopular Chechen war. Lebed was chosen for his charisma on TV, in contrast to other lackluster Russian politicians of the 1990s—polls showed his popularity surpassing Yeltsin's for some time. As the Secretary of the Security Council in the president's administration after the 1996 election, he also led the negotiations that ended the First Chechen War. Lebed was considered the most popular candidate for the presidential election of 2000 during Yeltsin's second term.

Like many Russian politicians who moved too quickly, Lebed died in a helicopter crash in 2002. As the saying goes, in Russia, "you don't end up in an accident, the accident finds you."

President Putin was in need of a bold figure serving his throne who could find a miraculous way out of the impasse in the special military operation (SMO) in eastern Ukraine. Enter "Yevgeny the Terrible." Many radical nationalists, both overt and covert, including some among the million-strong force of the "siloviki" (the Kremlin elites in uniform), are deeply dissatisfied with how Putin is handling the holy war against NATO in Ukraine. They question whether Putin is too soft.

They want Prigozhin to be a modern-day Ivan the Terrible who will lead Russia on the path to greatness. Prigozhin appears to be a good candidate because he has proven his capabilities as a general, is popular among the radicals, instills fear in his enemies, and possesses a world-famous media force that is rumored to have had the power to influence the outcome of the 2016 U.S. Presidential election. Prigozhin may not be the messiah, but for the Russians in the current situation, he seems quite promising.

Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu and General Valeriy Gerasimov have been disappointing in that the war in Ukraine, which they claimed would be over in six weeks, has dragged on for one and a half years. A stalemate signifies a loss for Russia, regardless of the number of Ukrainian casualties.
Russia is no ordinary nation; it is a military superpower, comparable to the United States in many sectors. Furthermore, Russia does not even pretend to be a liberal democracy.

Good or bad for NATO?

One could argue that Prigozhin is perfectly positioned to be Russia's "Admiral Dönitz" (referring to Karl Dönitz, who succeeded Hitler as the head of state and surrendered to the Allies in '45). Some speculate that Prigozhin might sign a truce with NATO on the day something terrible happens to Putin. However, if he were to do so, there is a risk that the FSB (the Russian version of the FBI) would lynch and hang Prigozhin in the streets of Moscow. Therefore, he would need an escape plan or some kind of deal with NATO or the CIA.

Is it really possible that Prigozhin would tell Washington and Brussels, "We're the ones carrying the weight of the war on our shoulders. So, if you want to strike a deal with Russia, you must talk to me"? Well, maybe. But at the same time, no one in the Pentagon is fooling themselves into thinking that Prigozhin is a closet admirer of the West or a spineless liberal turncoat. Even if Prigozhin is capable of winding down the war, he must tread carefully. Putin is trying to corner him. Recent appointments among the top brass of the special military operation (SMO) were made in clear defiance of Prigozhin. Putin ignored his calls for changes in the key figures behind the war effort.

Putin's spokesperson even challenged Prigozhin's reports of conquering Soledar. Putin may be getting old, but he is no pushover. He believes that there is only one lion in Russia.

Putin has an advantage in detecting early threats to his power as an ex-KGB officer with an extensive network. Unlike the anti-Putin opposition leader Alexei Navalny, Prigozhin seems to be a rare breed among Russia's politicians: he truly, madly, loves power and has the backing to survive military assaults.

Putin thinks that he can simply call the Lubyanka, dial one for a "freak accident," dial two for a "cardiac arrest," or dial three for "polonium-flavored coffee." Anyone who demonstrates superior talent that qualifies them for the top job in the Kremlin has found themselves in Putin's crosshairs. No one who can challenge Putin has been allowed to rise through the ranks, not even in their dreams.

The question is whether the Ukraine debacle has significantly weakened the foundations of Putin's power. Moreover, unlike other individuals demoted or eliminated by Putin in the past, Prigozhin has his own private army loyal to him.

How real is Prigozhin's rebellion? 

Some observers think the entire putsch by Wagner was deception or what the Russians call "Maskirovka". Remember good old Sun Tzu's claim in his masterpiece "The Art of War" that all warfare is based on deception. The 1978 Soviet Military Encyclopedia defines deception similarly, placing additional stress on strategic levels, and explicitly including political, economic and diplomatic measures besides the military ones. It largely repeats the 1944 Encyclopedia's concept, but adds that, "Strategic maskirovka is carried out at national and theater levels to mislead the enemy as to political and military capabilities, intentions and timing of actions. In these spheres, as war is but an extension of politics, it includes political, economic and diplomatic measures as well as military. In mid-June 2023, the Ministry of Defenseordered the Wagner Group to sign contracts with them before 1 July, 2023 effectively incorporating Wagner as a subordinate into the regular command structure and reducing Prigozhin's influence. 

However, Prigozhin refused to sign the deal, citing the incompetence on Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu's part. Prigozhin was no diplomat, calling his arch-enemy Shoigu a "vile creature" and promising to hang him. 

The order from Moscow to put Wagner under the MoD could undermine Prigozhin's influence over Wagner and endanger Wagner's lucrative business operations in Africa some tied to the lucrative mines in the Congo.

Prigozhin unsuccessfully attempted to circumvent the order for Wagner's subordination while intensifying his criticism of the MoD. According to sources within the Russian government, Kremlin officials were caught off-guard by the rebellion, initially believing Prigozhin's actions to be a bluff aimed at extracting concessions. They only realized the severity of the situation once Wagner forces captured Rostov-on-Don (a city in southern Russia, the hub of Russian military command operating in eastern Ukraine). The CIA and DIA obtained solid evidence of the impending rebellion, briefing military and Biden administration officials about Prighozin's plans on 21 June, after days of refining the intelligence findings, and after obtaining additional corroborating evidence also informing a group of members of Congress the next day. 

However, due to a lack of geostrategic interest in maintaining the integrity of Putin's administration, and a fear that advanced U.S. knowledge of the Wagner plot would be portrayed as evidence of a foreign conspiracy by the Russian state, the findings were not made public or shared with Putin and the Russian Govt. 
U.S. Intelligence officials were reportedly concerned about the implications of instability for the control of Russia's nuclear stockpile.

It is too early to say if this "rebellion" was real or stage-managed or a "Maskirovka". In the latter scenario, potential reasons for carrying it outiwould be to (a) withdraw Wagner Group forces from Ukraine for redeployment and (b) create scapegoats for Russia's failure to achieve victory, while also confusing Russia's enemies. Even if this was a genuine revolt, the end result could be to bring the Wagner Group under Russian government control, eliminating a potential rival center of power. Putin could be left weaker by this process, but it isn't obvious that he will be

Tying down the loose cannon, Wagner Group?

Some assume that Prigozhin was concerned about losing control of Wagner and that his true motive was to force the resignation of his rival, Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu, as well as Gen. Valeriy Gerasimov, through his actions. If that was the case, things did not go as expected.
Prigozhin was once a close ally of General Sergei Surovikin, the Commander of the Joint Group of Forces in the Special Military Operation zone (Prigozhin had previously lobbied for Gen. Surovikin to be put in charge of the Ministry of Defense) and also the G.U. (GRU) Deputy Chief, Lieutenant General Vladimir Alekseev. Prigozhin believed that Gen. Surovikin and Lt. Gen. Alekseev would support his rebellion or order their troops to stand up while Wagner troops were moving northwards from Rostov to Moscow.

However, Prigozhin's calculations failed in this regard. Both Gen. Surovikin and Lt. Gen. Alekseev remained loyal to Putin and openly condemned Prigozhin's bid for power. Gen. Surovikin even reminded his comrade that Vladimir Putin is the legitimate head of state and the commander-in-chief of the Russian military. The head of the Chechen Republic, Ramzan Kadyrov (another former ally of Prigozhin), also denounced Prigozhin and stated his loyalty to Putin. Kadyrov's personal bodyguard corps, the 141st Special Motorized Regiment ("Kadyrovites"), was deployed to Rostov to crush the effort.

For Prigozhin, the failure to gain the support of high-ranking Russian generals and Kadyrov may lead to the eventual failure of the rebellion. The Wagner troops could not fulfill their dream of taking over Moscow, a city of 12 million civilians.

Perhaps Prigozhin expected at least a few generals to back him, thereby dividing and weakening the Russian military. Without the support of the Russian military, Prigozhin cannot position himself to "negotiate" the replacement of Shoigu and Gerasimov.


댓글삭제
삭제한 댓글은 다시 복구할 수 없습니다.
그래도 삭제하시겠습니까?
댓글 0
댓글쓰기
계정을 선택하시면 로그인·계정인증을 통해
댓글을 남기실 수 있습니다.

  • ABOUT
  • CONTACT US
  • SIGN UP MEMBERSHIP
  • RSS
  • 2-D 678, National Assembly-daero, 36-gil, Yeongdeungpo-gu, Seoul, Korea (Postal code: 07257)
  • URL: www.koreaittimes.com | Editorial Div: 82-2-578- 0434 / 82-10-2442-9446 | North America Dept: 070-7008-0005 | Email: info@koreaittimes.com
  • Publisher and Editor in Chief: Monica Younsoo Chung | Chief Editorial Writer: Hyoung Joong Kim | Editor: Yeon Jin Jung
  • Juvenile Protection Manager: Choul Woong Yeon
  • Masthead: Korea IT Times. Copyright(C) Korea IT Times, All rights reserved.
ND소프트